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Coercing Assimilation: The Case of Muslim Women of
Color †
Sahar F. Aziz ∗

Thank you to Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems and the
Journal of Gender, Race & Justice for inviting me, and a special thanks to
Professor Wing for hosting us today. You all are very fortunate to have
Professor Wing as an advisor and mentor here at the University of Iowa
College of Law.
Today, I have been asked to address the domestic context of civil rights
issues facing Muslim women in the United States. Admittedly, examining the
experiences of Muslim American women is a risky endeavor because they are
such a diverse group of women ethnically, racially, socio-economically, and
religiously in terms of their levels of religiosity. 1 Hence, I acknowledge the risk
of essentializing, despite my best efforts to recognize the individual agency of
each Muslim woman.
This lecture is based on a larger project that examines the myriad ways
Muslim women are adversely affected by their intersectional identities, and
how it impacts their ability to be economically independent through gainful
employment. Due to time constraints, I will be summarizing my thesis and
supporting arguments on this complex topic. For those interested in delving
into the details, I refer you to my article in the Michigan Journal of Race &
Law entitled, Coercive Assimilationism: The Perils of Muslim Women’s Identity
Performance in the Workplace. 2 My presentation today also builds on the thesis
of a prior article, From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: Muslim-American

This Article is also featured in Journal of Gender, Race & Justice. Please use a string citation
when referencing this Article: Sahar F. Aziz, Coercing Assimilation: The Case of Muslim Women
of Color, 24(2) TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 341, 18(2) J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 389 (2015).
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See generally Sahar F. Aziz, Coercive Assimilationism: The Perils of Muslim Women’s Identity
Performance in the Workplace, 20 MICH. J. RACE & L. 101 (2014) [hereinafter Aziz, Coercive
Assimilationism].
2

342

TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 24:341

Women in the Crosshairs of Intersectionality, 3 wherein I proffer that Muslim
women are caught in the crosshairs of bias at the intersection of religion,
gender, and race or ethnicity.
After September 11, 2001, the stereotype of Muslim women as terrorists,
co-conspirators, or aiders and abettors to their male terrorist family members
has superseded the stereotype that they are oppressed, subjugated, infantile
beings, without individual agency who need to be saved by upper-middle-class
white American women. 4 Because a woman’s financial independence
contributes towards her ability to defend her rights and pursue the lifestyle of
her choosing, the treatment of women in the workplace is fundamental to
discussions on women’s rights, whether in the United States or abroad. As
such, my presentation today theorizes how implicit bias, stereotyping, and
assimilationist demands adversely affect Muslim women of color in
employment.
Specifically, I will examine how bias at the intersection of gender and
religion has affected Muslim women’s identity performance at work as they
struggle to receive equal opportunity in hiring, equal pay, promotions, equal
professional development opportunities, and the same treatment as other
similarly-situated employees. In doing so, I coin the term “coercive
assimilationism” as a form of implicit and explicit bias, which adversely affects
minorities in many white-collar professional workplaces—the hypothetical
backdrop of my analysis.
While assimilation into a particular workplace is imposed on all employees
to a certain degree, I distinguish between assimilationist demands
intrinsically associated with one’s race, gender, religion, or ethnicity based on
negative stereotypes and those that are objectively job-related. 5 Because an
employee’s income, career trajectory, and other employment opportunities are
at stake, the expectation to assimilate is inherently coercive even if consciously
voluntary.
Coercive assimilation manifests itself in workplace rules that are both
written and unwritten. These rules reward minority employees who behave,
talk, dress, and otherwise mirror the majority group, which, in 2015, I posit is
white, heterosexual, Christian, and male. 6 Rewards include being hired in the

3 See Sahar F. Aziz, From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: Muslim-American Women in the
Crosshairs of Intersectionality, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 191 (2012).
4 See Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality as “Catch 22”: Why Identity Performance Demands
Are Neither Harmless Nor Reasonable, 69 ALA. L. REV. 299, 302 (2006) (noting that persons of
intersectional minority groups “experience a qualitatively different kind of subordination”).

See generally Mark R. Bandsuch, Dressing Up Title VII’s Analysis of Workplace Appearance
Policies, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 288–89 (2009) (noting that Title VII has yet to solve a
new manifestation of discrimination: “trait discrimination”).
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6

Id. at 296.
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first place, 7 equal pay, and professional development opportunities that could
include training, client interaction, receiving high quality assignments, and
other perks that come from being a member of “the team.” 8 In contrast,
employees who refuse or are unable to adhere to coercive assimilationism
suffer adverse employment actions ranging from a stagnant career trajectory
to termination. In the end, failing to assimilate may result in intergroup
discrimination based on intragroup differences rooted in implicit or explicit
stereotyping. 9
In the case of Muslim women, coercive assimilationism places them in a
catch-twenty-two. Specifically, Muslim women suffer harm regardless of what
decision they make—to accommodate or to refuse to accommodate coercive
assimilationism—because the stereotypes that shape what is expected of them
by the majority group contradict each other. This places Muslim women in a
triple bind at the intersection of gender, religion, and race/ethnicity. For
example, if she behaves like a “good Muslim woman” who is not passive,
subjugated, or meek, then she may fall into the trap of being perceived as a
“bad woman”—who is too assertive, overtly ambitious, and abrasive—resulting
in her being labeled “a bitch.” Similarly, in her attempts to dispel stereotypes
that she is unable to think critically, incapable of leading, or lacking strength
of character, she may trigger stereotypes held by her coworkers that Muslims
are aggressive, prone to violence, untrustworthy, and disloyal outsiders. 10
Thus, whether Muslim women act as their authentic selves—whatever that
means for a particular woman—or if they intentionally shape their social,
religious, and racial identities to accommodate the expectations of the majority
group, their identity performance is ill-fated. Regardless of whether a Muslim
woman chooses or refuses to accommodate coercive assimilationist demands,
she is unlikely to become a member of the in-group and incur the consequent
benefits. 11
Contradictory stereotypes are often a product of both explicit and implicit
bias. Implicit bias, in particular, plays a larger role in discriminatory behavior
today than the explicit biases on full display in the 1960s when Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act was passed. 12 Consequently, Title VII does not
7

See generally LAUREN A. RIVERA, PEDIGREE: HOW ELITE STUDENTS GET ELITE JOBS 6–7 (2015).
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Id.
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Aziz, Coercive Assimilationism, supra note 2, at 105–06.

See generally Haleh Afshar, The Politics of Fear: What Does It Mean to Those Who Are Otherized
and
Feared?,
36
ETHNIC
&
RACIAL
STUD.
9
(2013),
http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/01419870.2013.738821
(discussing the implications of systemic and entrenched demonization of Muslims by the media
and politicians).
10

11 See Thomas M. Ostrom & Constantine Sedikides, Out-Group Homogeneity Effects in Natural
and Minimal Groups, 112(3) PSYCHOL. BULL. 536, 536 (1992) (noting that people tend to favor, in
terms of resource allocation, members of their own group than members of other groups).

See, e.g., Bandsuch, supra note 5, at 317–19 (arguing for a totality of the circumstances approach
to Title VII, which would scrutinize whether “certain community standards have a demeaning or
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adequately remedy discrimination arising from implicit biases that produce
unspoken, but nonetheless prevalent, negative stereotypes incorporated into
workplace rules and professionalism discourse.
Before delving into the perils of Muslim women’s identity performance in
the workplace, I want to summarize the basic doctrine for a Title VII
employment discrimination claim. Under Title VII, a plaintiff has the burden
of proving the following: (1) she is a member of a protected class, which includes
gender, race, color, ethnicity, or religion; (2) she suffered an adverse
employment action, including, but not limited to, failure to hire, termination,
failure to promote, or unequal pay compared to other similarly situated
employees; and (3) that her protected class status was a motivating factor in
the alleged adverse employment action. 13 If she is able to make a prima facie
case of employment discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the
employer to provide a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action, and if the employer is successful, then the employee has
the burden of proof to demonstrate that the proffered reason was, in fact,
pretext. 14 In proving that her protected status was a motivating factor for the
adverse employment action, the plaintiff must typically rely on circumstantial
evidence arising from implicit bias because evidence of explicit bias is often
unavailable. 15
In addition, the plaintiff must compare herself to similarly situated
employees in terms of skills, experience, education, and other job qualifications
in order to succeed in a Title VII employment discrimination suit. 16 Often this
involves looking to the employer’s treatment of similarly situated male, nonMuslim, or white employees. For instance, the plaintiff may point to a man
who is paid more for the same work as proof that she experienced unlawful
disparate treatment, or she may point to a white employee who received a
promotion that she was denied. When there are other employees in the same
protected class as the plaintiff, however, an employer will typically point to
offensive history of stereotypes or bias, the potential to force assimilation, or an adverse impact on
employment opportunities”).
13 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See also Rudin v. Lincoln Land
Cmty. Coll., 420 F.3d 712, 720 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Circumstantial evidence of discrimination . . .
allows the trier of fact to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.” (internal
quotation omitted)); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in
Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997,
1059 (2006) (noting that most cases rely on circumstantial evidence).
14

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802–04.

Per McDonnell Douglas, at the prima facie stage, when a plaintiff relies on circumstantial
evidence in order to justify mandating an employer to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse employment action, the plaintiff must produce persuasive evidence that
raises a presumption of unlawful discrimination. Id. at 792.

15

See Maynard v. Bd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003) (“To prevail on a claim for
discrimination under Title VII based on circumstantial evidence, [the plaintiff] must show that: .
. . [she] was treated less favorably than a similarly-situated individual outside [her] protected
class.”).
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such employees to counter allegations that the adverse employment action was
unlawfully taken based on a protected class. For example, if there are other
Muslim women in the workplace, the employer may point to a Muslim woman
who has not experienced the same adverse treatment as the plaintiff as proof
that the basis of the action against the plaintiff was merit-based and lawful. It
is in such circumstances when coercive assimilationism can play a pernicious
role in producing intergroup discrimination based on differences in identity
performance among members of the same protected class(es). Muslim women
willing and able to accommodate assimilationist demands may be granted
better employment opportunities than Muslim women whose behavior, dress,
speech, and associations do not accommodate assimilationist demands, or
cause discomfort to the majority group. A fault line is thus created between the
“good Muslim woman” who assimilates (voluntarily or because of pressure to
do so) and the “bad Muslim woman” who performs her gender, religious, or
racial identity in ways that the majority group disapproves, finds offensive, or
finds discomforting. 17 The result is intergroup discrimination based on
intragroup differences, which the judiciary often fails to recognize.
This proposition begs the question of what types of behaviors, dress, and
speech might be looked upon as threatening or, by contrast, normal to the
majority group? Admittedly, an attempt to answer this question risks
essentializing both the majority group and the minority employees at issue.
Nevertheless, I think it warrants a discussion to expose the pervasiveness of
implicit bias rooted in negative stereotypes of particular groups and the myriad
harms that result. Kenji Yoshino’s groundbreaking work on converting,
passing, and covering of minority groups as identity performance strategies
offers insights into the experiences of Muslim women of color in the
workplace. 18
“Converting” entails changing one’s underlying identity altogether. 19 A
Muslim woman who decides to engage in converting her identity may do the
following: convert from Islam to Christianity, legally change her ethnicsounding name to a common American name, and marry a white Christian
male. The converted woman would raise her children in a white Christian
community, socialize with other white Christian families, and effectively live
a life where no one knows or has reason to know that she was born and raised
by a non-white Muslim family. In her mind, and in the minds of others, she is
a white Christian female of European origin. In the end, she has converted out
of her subordinated identity and into the majority group’s identity.

Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701,
714–19 (2001). See generally DEVON CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE?: RETHINKING RACE
IN “POST-RACIAL” AMERICA (2013).
17

18

Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 772–73 (2002).

19

Id. at 772.
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“Passing” occurs when the underlying identity is retained, but masked. 20
A Muslim woman who adopts passing as an identity performance strategy
keeps her underlying identity, but hides it from her employers and coworkers.
She hopes her coworkers will mistakenly believe she is a white Christian
woman, and thereby avoid the adverse effects of being marked as a member of
a subordinated group. Accordingly, a Muslim woman of color may keep her
legal non-European name, but at work go by a common nickname, like Katie
instead of Khadija or Sue instead of Su’ad, such that none of her coworkers
know that her real name is not an English name. She may hide her associations
with other Muslims, or people of her racial or ethnic background, from her
coworkers. She may marry a man that also goes by an English nickname and
passes as a white non-Muslim based on his appearance, dress, and speech. She
may name her children cross-over names that can be both Arabic and English,
or Urdu and English, such as Sarah, Adam, Jenna, Sophia, Zack, or Sammy.
She may not disclose her travels to her country of origin, so as to not trigger
suspicions of divided national loyalties. Her social and professional dress is
western and liberal, such that nothing about her appearance discloses her
Muslim identity. If anyone were to accidentally discover her ethnic heritage or
religious identity, they would surprisingly remark, “I had no idea you were
Arab,” or “I had no idea you were Muslim,” to which she would dismissively
point out that it is her parents’ identity and quickly change the subject.
For converting or passing to be an option for a particular Muslim woman,
she must literally “look white” in terms of skin tone and phenotype. For many
Muslim women of color in the United States, the majority of whom are either
African American or recent immigrants from Asia, the Middle East, or Africa,
converting and passing is not an option, even if it is desired by that particular
woman. 21 This leaves covering as the predominant identity performance
strategy for those seeking to accommodate assimilationist demands.
“Covering” is the adoption of appearances, associations, speech, and
behaviors that allay the majority group’s discomfort with or fear of the
minority group. 22 In covering her identity, a Muslim woman retains and
discloses her underlying identity, but performs it in such a way that it makes
it more palatable and more comforting to the majority group. She consciously
seeks to avoid making the majority group feel threatened or uncomfortable
with her Muslim and ethnic identity. As such, the identity-covering Muslim
woman may do the following: refrain from wearing a headscarf; speak in
unaccented English with the local vernacular accent; straighten her otherwise
curly hair, wear clothes viewed as Western and liberal, as opposed to
conservative and Islamic; and go out of her way to express her patriotism to

20

Id.

See Sahar F. Aziz, Sticks and Stones, The Words That Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes Eight Years
After 9/11, 13 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 33, 45–46 (2009) (providing a summary of the diverse races and
ethnicities that comprise the Muslim community in the United States).

21

22

Yoshino, supra note 18, at 772.
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the United States, such as supporting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Rather than criticize her coworkers when they make bigoted or Orientalist
jokes about Muslims or her country of origin, the identity-covering Muslim
woman either laughs along with her coworkers or refrains from challenging
their prejudices. If she is a practicing Muslim, she does not publicize her
religiosity or seek religious accommodation, nor does she disclose her
attendance at the local mosque. Because she adheres to the dominant colorblind narrative that discrimination is an anachronistic anomaly rather than
part of a systemic societal problem, she does not participate in civil rights
activities in defense of Muslims, Arabs, or South Asians.
In the end, the identity-covering Muslim woman becomes the accepted
“cultural Muslim” women, rather than the suspected “practicing Muslim”
woman. In doing so, she seeks to be the exception to the negative stereotypes
in order to avoid having to confront the adverse effects of such stereotypes. So
long as she is always a pleasant and deferential woman, assimilated into the
majority group’s culture, and downplays her religious and ethnic identity, her
disclosed Muslim and ethnic identities are viewed as proof of the organization’s
emphasis on diversity. Indeed, she becomes the exhibit to which the employer
points to when it is accused of discrimination by a Muslim woman who refuses
or cannot convert, hide, or cover her subordinated identities. In short, the less
she “acts Muslim” or “acts Muslim female” in ways that the majority group
finds threatening or discomforting, the more likely she is to receive equal
employment opportunities.
Paradoxically, even if a Muslim woman is willing to accommodate coercive
assimilationism, she may still find herself denied equal opportunities because
of the intersectionality of her identities. In other words, she may trigger one
stereotype in her attempts to counter another. For instance, the more assertive
a Muslim woman is—as a means of casting off misperceptions of her passivity
or inability to lead—the more likely she may trigger stereotypes of Muslims as
aggressive and threatening. In addition, if she tries to counter the stereotype
of the meek and oppressed Muslim woman, she may trigger gender stereotypes
that disparagingly portray driven and assertive women as abrasive, arrogant,
and competitive—characteristics deemed assets for men in the workplace.
Thus, a Muslim woman’s assertiveness may simultaneously violate gender
norms, further exposing her to discrimination based on gender stereotyping.
To offset these stereotypes, her attempts to exercise deference—to dispel
suspicions of her loyalty or “civility”—reinforce stereotypes of her as
submissive and unable to lead. 23 Furthermore, depending on her actual or
perceived racial or ethnic identity, a Muslim woman’s behavior, dress, speech,
and mannerisms may trigger negative stereotypes associated with African

Jen’nan Ghazel Read & John Bartkowski, To Veil or Not to Veil?: A Case Study of Identity
Negotiation Among Muslim Women in Austin, Texas, 14 GENDER & SOC’Y 395, 396 (2000);
Kimberly A. Yuracko, The Antidiscrimination Paradox: Why Sex Before Race?, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
1, 7 (2009).

23

348

TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 24:341

Americans, Arabs, Pakistanis, Afghanis, or other non-white groups. 24 If she
refuses to be “the good woman,” “the good Muslim,” or “the good minority
employee,” she will be stigmatized and penalized under the pretext that she is
insubordinate, too aggressive, not a team player, not professional, or just not
the right fit.
A strong and assertive personality may also cause the majority group to
feel threatened by a Muslim, whose loyalties are quickly questioned when she
shows any signs of aggression or disagreement with authority. Additionally, if
the identity she is meticulously covering is exposed as too religious or too
ethnic, she may be suspected of duplicity and deception. In the end she is
damned if she does and damned if she doesn’t, thereby leaving her to choose
between the lesser of two depraved options, both of which deny her meaningful
equal opportunities and control over her identity.
All of this begs the question: Who are we to judge how a Muslim woman
chooses to perform her multiple identities? So what if she chooses to wear short
skirts and sleeveless shirts, uncovers her hair, hides her associations with
Muslims, supports American militarism in the Middle East, or uses an English
nickname? Even though we may be uncomfortable making these judgments
about Muslim women’s identity performances, the reality is that employers do
so every day; employers act on their judgments of employees’ identity
performance through distribution of resources and access to opportunities in
the workplace based on subjective, majoritarian values and cultural norms. As
a result, minority employees who fail or refuse to accommodate those values
and norms, often guised under the rubric of “professionalism,” “civility,” or
“collegiality,” may be overlooked for promotion, given lower quality work
assignments, denied access to clients, set on a marginalized career track, or
terminated.

Irene Browne & Joya Misra, The Intersection of Gender and Race in the Labor Market, 29 ANN.
REV. SOC. 487, 490 (2003); William H. Turner, Myths and Stereotypes: The African Man in America,
in THE BLACK MALE IN AMERICA 123 (Doris Y. Wilkinson & Ronald L. Taylor eds., 1977). See also
Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Remedying Employment Discrimination Against African-American Males:
Stereotypical Biases Engender a Case of Race Plus Sex Discrimination, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 23, 34–
35 (1996) (discussing the stereotypical perceptions of African-American men by white Americans
and foreigners); Kathryn M. Neckerman & Joleen Kirschenman, Hiring Strategies, Racial Bias,
and Inner-City Workers, 38 SOC. PROBS. 433, 440 (1991) (finding that 47.2 percent of Chicago
employers surveyed felt that inner-city African-American workers in selected occupations lacked
work ethic); Yaser Ali, Comment, Shariah and Citizenship—How Islamophobia is Creating a
Second-Class Citizenry in America, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1037 (2012) (explaining that Arabs have
“collectively [been] indicted . . . as public enemy #1—brutal, heartless, uncivilized religious fanatics
and money-mad cultural ‘others’ bent on terrorizing civilized Westerners, especially Christians
and Jews . . . Arabs are brute murderers, sleazy rapists, religious fanatics, oil-rich dimwits, and
abusers of women”); Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans: The “Reticent” Minority and Their Paradoxes,
36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 24 (1994) (explaining that Asians are stereotyped as the “model
minority” implying that “Asian Americans, through their hard work, intelligence, and emphasis
on education and achievement have been successful in American society”). But see Miranda Oshige
McGowan & James Lindgren, Testing the “Model Minority Myth”, 100 NW. U.L. REV. 331, 331
(2006) (arguing that the “positive image of Asian Americans as a model minority conceals a more
sinister core of beliefs about Asian Americans and other racial minorities in America”).
24
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The potential harms of coercive assimilationism are not only economic, but
also causes psychological harm to minorities—both assimilating and nonassimilating—from which members of the majority group are shielded. 25 For
instance, social psychologists have documented that individuals who refuse or
are unable to assimilate are stigmatized by the majority group. 26 Furthermore,
minorities who choose to assimilate may be stigmatized by their own minority
group, as they are derogatorily called “sellouts.” As a consequence of coercive
assimilationism, minorities suffer lower self-esteem than those who feel a
sense of belonging to their minority in-group, and if the majority group merely
tolerates, but does not fully accept the identity-passing or covering Muslim
woman as a member of the group, she may find herself emotionally and
psychologically isolated. Over time, such psychological pressures affect a
minority employees’ wellbeing, which, in turn, affects her work performance in
ways not experienced by employees who belong to the majority group. The
more an employee must focus on “fitting in,” the less time and mental energy
she has to focus on performing her job—placing her at a marked disadvantage
to employees whose values, norms, and cultures are the basis for written and
unwritten workplace rules.
For these reasons, judges should be skeptical of catch-all terms, such as
“professionalism,” “collegiality,” “civility,” and “workplace culture” as
justifications for adverse employment actions. While these terms may appear
neutral on their face, they are laden with values that privilege certain races,
ethnicities, religions, and genders over others in ways that are not necessarily
job-related.
While there is no perfect solution to this social and political problem that
affects workplaces across the country, I argue that it can be mitigated by
having judges understand the pernicious effects of implicit bias rooted in
stereotypes. One place to start is to seriously consider plaintiffs’ arguments
that their disparate treatment arises from how they perform their religious,
racial, or gender identities, not simply the identity per se. In addition,
purported professionalism standards should not be taken as facially neutral,
but rather be examined as subjective rules based on the values of those who
develop them—a group not necessarily representative of America’s diverse
labor pool.
The vague behavioral components of professionalism standards can be
particularly pernicious. For instance, traits such as good judgment, civility,
collegiality, and effective communication are often cited as components of
professionalism. 27 These are subjective terms, whose definitions depend on the
25

Bandsuch, supra note 5, at 294–95.

Nyla Branscombe & Naomi Ellemers, Coping with Group-Based Discrimination: Individualistic
Versus Group-Level Strategies, in PREJUDICE: THE TARGET’S PERSPECTIVE 259 (Janet K. Swim &
Charles Stangor eds., 1998).
26

See Laura Morgan Roberts & Darryl D. Roberts, Testing the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law:
The Business, Legal, and Ethical Ramifications of Cultural Profiling at Work, 14 DUKE J. GENDER

27
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interpreter and are inherently associated with a particular set of cultural
norms and values. When infected with implicit bias, professionalism codes can
provide pretext for unlawful disparate treatment of minority groups. 28
Furthermore, implicit bias homogenizes employees within protected groups to
hire, promote, and retain only those able and willing to assimilate to the
majority culture with minimal regard for whether such assimilationist
demands are job-related. 29
Simply having a “colorful picture” of the various colors, genders, and
ethnicities represented in a particular workplace does not necessarily evince a
discrimination-free environment. Workplace dress codes that prohibit hair
styles unique to African Americans discriminate based on racial stereotypes
that dreadlocks, braids, or cornrows are dirty, disheveled, or strange. 30
Professionalism standards that effectively reward deferential and perpetually
pleasant women, while penalizing overtly confident and assertive women
discriminate based on gender stereotypes—particularly when the same
standards are not applied to male employees. 31
As such, judges should incorporate applicable social-psychology literature
into their analysis and adjudication of employment discrimination cases, which
documents the psychological, dignitary, and material harms caused by
stereotyping and the disproportionate pressures to assimilate placed upon
minorities. 32 Judges should acknowledge that minority employees must work
harder and exert more mental energies than their non-minority coworkers in
order to be recognized as competent and worthy of being there. All of this
consumes their energy and distracts their mental focus away from performing
the work, which directly contradicts formalist liberal conceptions of “equal pay
for equal work” and merit-based employment. By considering the social science
literature, judges will be better equipped to judiciously examine employers’
arguments that because other employees within the plaintiffs’ protected
class(es) were not disparately treated, the plaintiff suffered no discrimination.
As long as the minority employee is willing to convert, pass, or cover her
subordinated identity, the majority group will play along with the employee
and pretend the employee is not in fact Muslim, Arab, or South Asian. It is
L. & POL’Y 369, 377 (2007) (examining how employers engage in cultural profiling through the use
of professionalism codes, among other things, to penalize employees who engage in deviant
cultural behavior).
28

Id.

29

See, e.g., RIVERA, supra note 7, at 6–7.

Wendy Greene, Title VII: What’s Hair (And Other Race-Based Characteristics) Got To Do With
It?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1355, 1388 (2008).
30

31

See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-51 (1989).

See Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework Evidence in
Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 44–45 (2009) (noting that
social scientists have identified biases and stereotypes which they could “explain for legal decision
makers”).
32

Fall 2015]

COERCIVE ASSIMILATIONISM

351

only when we can honestly declare that a Muslim woman of color has the same
agency and choice as a member of the majority group in performing her
multiple identities in ways that she finds authentic and non-oppressive,
without being penalized in the workplace, that we can celebrate progress in
civil rights. Until then, we have much work to do.

